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Abstract 
This study aimed to investigate the ability of self-managing teams to negotiate effectively 
relative to traditionally led teams. Based on previous literature leaders were expected to 
increase their teams’ joint outcomes by facilitating information exchange. More 
specifically, leaders were expected to provide and seek information, as well as listening 
closely to the information provided. Using a three-person negotiation the effects of 
leadership were studied, as well as the effect of incentivising one team member to facilitate 
information exchange whilst still retaining autonomy within the group. It was expected that 
groups with a leader or advice would achieve higher judgement accuracy through 
facilitation of information exchange. Furthermore, this increase in judgement accuracy was 
expected to lead to an increase in joint outcomes. Neither of these hypotheses was 
supported by the data. Possible causes and implications are discussed.  
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Managing to self-manage negotiations: the absence of formal leadership and its effect 
on negotiation abilities 
In recent decades, organisations have been showing a shift towards the greater use 
of teams (Morgeson, DeRue & Karam, 2010), particularly self-managing ones. Indeed 
Druskat and Wheeler (2004) state that 79% of Fortune 1000 companies make use of self-
managing teams in their organisations. Although there are numerous definitions of self-
managed teams, what they have in common is that workers in self-managed teams are free 
to make autonomous decisions, without referring back to an externally appointed leader 
(Nijholt & Benders, 2010). The introduction of self-managed teams has produced some 
mixed results regarding their effectiveness (Allen & Hecht, 2004). Many studies have 
reported benefits of self-management in teams (Erez, Lepine & Elms, 2002; Rousseau & 
Aubé, 2010; Solansky, 2008; Yang & Guy, 2011). As predicted by self-determination 
theory (Gagné & Deci, 2005), the greater autonomy enjoyed by self-managed teams results 
in members being happier, less stressed, less fatigued and more satisfied with their working 
conditions (Allen & Hecht, 2004). However other studies have shown less promising 
results (DeVaro, 2008; Manz & Sims, 1982) and many benefits are contingent on certain 
conditions, such as the type of goals that are set (Alper, Tjosvold & Law, 1998), task 
routineness (Rousseau & Aubé, 2010) and leadership emergence and rotation (Erez et al., 
2002). Although self-managing teams appear to have great potential, it is clearly important 
that we gain an understanding of the conditions that must be met to allow autonomous 
teams to fulfil that potential. One area in which we currently understand very little about 
the potential and requirements of self-managing teams is decision-making and negotiation. 
As Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2012, p. xxv) noted, “Like it or not, you are a negotiator. 
Negotiation is a fact of life… Everyone negotiates something every day.” It is not 
surprising therefore, that negotiation has produced a rich field of literature over the years 
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(Caputo, 2013; Kersten & Lai, 2007; Li, Tost & Wade-Benzoni, 2007; Malhotra & 
Bazerman, 2008; Menkel-Meadow, 2010; Thompson, 1990; Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 
2010; Wall & Blum, 1991). However, much negotiation literature has focused on 
negotiating in dyads, leaving much to be learned about negotiations taking place within 
groups of three or more members, such as teams. Moving from a two-person negotiation to 
a negotiation including more people creates greater social and procedural complexity. 
Having more negotiation counterparts requires more information to be exchanged, 
processed and remembered by a greater number of people. It also introduces various 
options for decision-making rules. In dyadic negotiation or decision-making, the two 
negotiators must simply manage to agree with one another. In a multi-party negotiation 
negotiators could employ a similar unanimity rule but they could also use a majority rule 
(Beersma & De Dreu, 1999). One rule that is particularly relevant to work teams is the 
dictator rule, in which one person has the power of making the final decisions (Van Tol & 
Steinel, 2017). In traditionally led teams, the dictator rule is particularly applicable, as the 
boss of the team would most likely have the final say on any decisions being made. 
However, for many decisions in self-managing teams no one has the legitimate power or 
authority required to implement a dictator rule. Consequently self-managed teams must 
turn to other decision-making rules, such as unanimity or majority rule. In light of the 
recent trend towards appointing more self-managing teams, it is worth investigating how 
decision-making rules and the absence of formal leadership affect self-managed teams’ 
ability to negotiate effectively. Can self-managed teams negotiate just as well, or possibly 
even better, without a leader? Or does the absence of a formal leader reduce the 
effectiveness of self-managed teams’ negotiations?  
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Self-managing teams 
Self-managed teams, otherwise known as autonomous teams, possess a number of 
features that make them different to traditionally structured work groups, and may thus 
influence their decision-making processes. Members of self-managed teams are entrusted to 
make autonomous decisions, without referring back to an appointed leader, including 
important decisions that may typically be made by management. For instance, self-
managed teams may be responsible for deciding when to work or how exactly 
responsibilities should be carried out (Nijholt & Benders, 2010). Self-managed teams are 
thus given greater responsibility over the decision-making process. Furthermore, self-
managed teams are given responsibility for relatively complete tasks and projects, as 
opposed to performing just one element of a task, which is then completed by a different 
employee or work team (Cohen, Ledford & Spreitzer, 1996; Moorhead, Neck & West, 
1998). In this sense, self-managed teams are relatively self-contained. To encourage self-
managed teams to work together as a group, members are often rewarded at the group level, 
with individual rewards being made contingent upon group performance (Moorhead et al., 
1998). This creates pro-social intentions and encourages members to take the group’s 
interests into account, as well as their own. Taking both personal and team interests into 
account is particularly relevant when making team decisions as some team members may 
hold different preferences to others. For instance, one team member may wish to work 
longer shifts in order to earn more salary, whereas another team member may prioritise a 
good work-life balance. Consequently, when making autonomous team decisions, team 
members must reconcile their differing preferences by engaging in negotiation.  
Fisher et al. (2012, p. xxv) define negotiation as “back-and-forth communication designed 
to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and 
others that are opposed”. From this definition it is clear that negotiation revolves around 
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balancing one’s own interests and preferences with those of the other group members. 
Indeed, negotiation and decision-making often resemble so-called ‘social dilemmas’, a 
situation in which each individual in the group must choose between pursuing individual 
gain and cooperating with the group. For each individual, non-cooperation is the most 
appealing option, producing the highest individual outcome (relative to cooperating), 
regardless of the others’ choice to cooperate or defect. However, if everyone pursues 
individual gain at the expense of the others, everyone is worse off than if they had all 
cooperated. In a negotiation, this would be the equivalent of everyone digging their heels in 
and reaching a stalemate, making it impossible to reach a decision at all. However, if some 
people cooperate and others defect, then those who cooperated will end up being exploited. 
This is very similar to a situation in which one person is very powerful and shows concern 
only for their own interests, demanding many concessions from a less powerful 
counterpart. This latter scenario, at least, would seem highly unlikely in a self-managed 
team as, in theory, no single team member has more power than the others. However, this is 
not to say that autonomous teams are necessarily better at negotiating than traditionally led 
teams. An appointed leader may also bring benefits to the negotiating table, for instance by 
helping to avoid stalemates, structuring the negotiation, or ensuring that the negotiation 
stays on track. To discover how a leader may contribute to or detract from effective 
negotiation, it is necessary to determine what ‘effective negotiation’ entails.  
 
Effective Negotiation 
Within self-managed teams, where individual rewards are often made contingent 
upon group outcomes, negotiation success could be defined as the maximisation of joint 
outcomes. In other words, the better the group performs as a whole the more successful 
their negotiation would be considered to be. Excellent group-level performance would help 
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the team to flourish, as well as maximise the rewards for each individual team member. In 
order to aid the group as a whole, the team members must strive to satisfy everyone’s needs 
to the best of their ability, and in order to satisfy everyone, the team must focus on finding 
win-win solutions to the problems they face. Negotiation that focuses on creating win-win 
situations is termed ‘integrative negotiation’ and one method of integrative negotiation that 
can be applied in multi-issue negotiations is logrolling (Tajima & Fraser, 2001). Logrolling 
is the term used to describe the trading-off of issues that are less important to one 
negotiator, but highly important to the other and vice versa. By making concessions on 
low-priority issues, a negotiator does not greatly damage their individual outcomes, but 
their counterpart’s outcomes are greatly increased, increasing joint outcomes overall. 
Similarly, a negotiator’s counterpart can then reciprocate by conceding on an issue that 
may not be very important to them, but greatly improves the outcomes of the negotiator. In 
doing this, joint outcomes are maximised as each negotiator gains the outcomes that are 
most important to them. 
Only if everyone’s preferences and priorities are known can options for mutual gain 
via logrolling be identified. Thus, to be able to negotiate integratively, the group must have 
information about, and a sound understanding of, each group member’s preferences. 
Assuming that not all information about preferences is shared prior to starting the 
negotiation, information exchange must take place to make everyone’s preferences known. 
Provided that information exchange is a sufficient condition for integrative negotiation, we 
would expect information exchange to lead to more integrative agreements. Thompson 
(1991) studied the effect of providing and seeking information in negotiations and found 
that increased information provision and search does indeed lead to higher joint outcomes, 
suggesting more integrative agreements. However, Thompson (1991) also stated the 
importance of explicitly instructing negotiators to seek and provide information to 
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overcome the restrictive effects of the fixed-pie perception. The fixed-pie perception is 
defined as “the tendency to assume that the other party places the same importance – or has 
the same priorities as the self – on the to-be-negotiated issues when the potential for 
mutually beneficial trades exists” (Thompson & Hastie, 1990, p. 101). Thompson (1991) 
argued that negotiators holding a fixed-pie perception would not engage in information 
exchange, as they believe they already know the priorities of their counterpart, which they 
assume to be identical to their own.  
So, for effective negotiation that maximises joint outcomes it is essential that 
negotiators exchange information openly and honestly, and instructing them to do so is 
important to overcoming the effects of the fixed-pie perception. By exchanging information 
about preferences, the fixed-pie perception can be reduced and options for mutual gain can 
be identified and implemented in order to create win-win solutions. For self-managed teams 
it is thus important to know how the removal of formal leadership may influence 
information exchange. This would allow self-managed teams to recognise where their 
relative advantage lies, or else know how to compensate for any potential disadvantages 
that may arise from the removal of appointed leadership. As negotiation processes within 
self-managed teams, or indeed within groups of three or more people, have not been given 
much attention in the literature to date, the most effective way to gauge the effects of 
removing leadership may be to examine the effects of leadership and power on negotiation 
processes.  
 
Power in negotiation 
Power, within a negotiation and in general, can be defined in many ways (Kim, 
Pinkley & Fragale, 2005). A common definition of power in a negotiation is the availability 
of an attractive best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) (Brett & Thompson, 
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2016; Kim et al., 2005; Magee, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, 2007; Nelson, Bronstein, Shacham & 
Ben-Ari, 2015; Wei & Luo, 2012). Another conceptualisation of power is French and 
Raven’s (1959) five power bases: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert 
power and referent power. In our study we define power as the ability to make binding 
decisions on behalf of the group (in other words, the ability to implement a dictator rule), 
much like the leader of a traditional work team. Power, in its diverse forms, has been 
shown to have a wide range of effects on (negotiation) behaviour. It has been shown to 
make people more proactive (Magee et al., 2007), more aggressive (Fast & Chen, 2009), 
take more risks (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), less likely to empathise and take their 
counterpart’s perspective (Galinsky, Magee, Ena Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006; Van Kleef, 
Oveis, Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz & Keltner, 2008), more likely to derogate subordinates 
(Georgesen & Harris, 2006), more competitive (Mannix, 1993) and more likely to act in 
one’s own interests (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). Based on these findings it would appear 
that power is a very destructive force within a negotiation. In this regard, one would expect 
self-managed teams to have a relative advantage when negotiating, as they need not fear the 
aggressive, risk-taking, selfish tendencies of a leader. In line with this, a number of studies 
have found that power differences led to lower joint outcomes in negotiation (For example 
Giebels, De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 2000; Van Tol & Steinel, 2017; Wolfe & McGinn, 
2005). However, the effects of power are not limited to negative ones. Power has also been 
shown to make negotiators process information more globally and abstractly, therefore 
making them better able to detect underlying patterns (Mast, Jonas & Hall, 2009; Smith & 
Trope, 2006). High-power negotiators have further been shown to be more generous (Brett 
& Thompson, 2016), particularly when they have absolute power, as opposed to partial 
power (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke & De Dreu, 2008; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 
2000). Having absolute power evokes a sense of social responsibility, inspiring leaders to 
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become more considerate of others’ interests as opposed to just their own. Indeed, high-
power negotiators have been found to be more procedurally just, listening more closely to 
others’ interests and desires (Blader & Chen, 2012). Furthermore, power has been shown to 
make negotiators more likely to seek and create solutions, more obliging and less 
dominating (Nelson et al., 2015). Powerful negotiators also share their information more 
openly (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), expressing their true opinions more than low-power 
negotiators (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). In line with these findings, a number of studies 
have found that groups with a leader achieved higher joint outcomes than those without 
(Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg & Wilke, 2001; Van Tol & Steinel, 2017; Wei & 
Luo, 2012). So it seems that power dispersion can be either helpful or harmful to joint 
negotiation outcomes. However there is one important factor that appears to qualify this 
contradiction; social motives. All of the studies that found a positive effect of leadership on 
joint outcomes did so only when leaders were pro-socially motivated. Indeed, Van Tol and 
Steinel’s (2017) study directly compared leaders of pro-social groups and leaders of pro-
self groups and found that leaders of pro-self groups were indeed selfish, claiming most 
value for themselves, whereas the leaders of the pro-social groups helped the groups to 
achieve higher joint outcomes than pro-social groups without a leader. From these results 
we might conclude that leadership within a pro-socially motivated group, such as a self-
managed team, is actually beneficial to joint negotiation outcomes. As discussed in the 
previous section, information exchange lies at the heart of integrative negotiation, and 
based on the literature presented here it seems that leaders of pro-social groups may 
facilitate information exchange in a number of ways. Firstly, high-power leaders are more 
likely to express their own opinions openly (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006), contributing to information provision. Secondly, they take a greater 
interest in others’ interests (Handgraaf et al., 2008; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000), actively 
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seeking solutions and underlying patterns (Mast et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2015; Smith & 
Trope, 2006). Finally, they appear to listen more closely to information being provided by 
others (Blader & Chen, 2012). Without formal leadership, self-managed teams appear to be 
missing out on this facilitation of information exchange, putting them at a relative 
disadvantage compared to pro-social teams with traditional leadership. However, we have 
seen that the autonomy of self-managed teams also brings with it certain advantages, 
particularly for team members’ well-being (Allen & Hecht, 2004). Removing this 
autonomy would therefore amount to trading one advantage for another.  
 
The current study 
Firstly, this study aims to replicate Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) finding that pro-
social teams with a leader perform better in negotiations than pro-social groups without a 
formal leader. To this end, this study shall partially replicate their study, replicating their 
pro-social teams with and without a leader, and use the same research paradigm. The pro-
social groups without a leader will closely resemble self-managed teams. Replicating this 
finding is a prerequisite to the main goal of this study, namely to discover whether the 
beneficial negotiation effects of a formal leader can be induced in self-managed teams 
without reducing the team autonomy. To examine this, a condition in which one team 
member shall be incentivised to facilitate information exchange through providing 
information, seeking information and listening carefully to the information provided shall 
be added to the research design. These behaviours closely match those displayed by pro-
social leaders in previous studies. These information exchange facilitation behaviours are 
expected to increase information exchange and processing, and thus improve each group 
member’s judgement accuracy concerning the other group members’ preferences. 
Consequently, in the groups with a leader or an incentivised member, group members 
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would be expected to have a more accurate understanding and recall of their fellow 
negotiators’ preferences, more so than in the self-managed groups. 
 
H1a: The groups with one incentivised member will achieve higher scores on a judgement 
accuracy questionnaire than the self-managed groups.  
 
H1b: The groups with a leader will achieve higher scores on a judgement accuracy 
questionnaire than the self-managed groups.  
 
Additionally, as the leaders and incentivised negotiators are expected to similarly facilitate 
information exchange and processing, the groups with a pro-social leader are expected to 
have a similarly high level of judgement accuracy compared to the groups in which 
information exchange is incentivised.  
 
H1c: The groups with one incentivised member will not differ from the pro-social groups 
with a leader in terms of judgement accuracy scores. 
 
It is expected that this greater judgement accuracy is what allows pro-social groups with a 
leader to use more integrative negotiation techniques, thus gaining higher joint outcomes. 
As the groups with an incentivised member and the groups with a leader are expected to 
outperform the self-managed groups in terms of judgement accuracy, the groups with an 
incentivised member or a leader are thus also expected to outperform the self-managed 
groups in terms of joint outcomes. 
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H2a: The groups with an incentivised member will achieve higher joint outcomes than the 
self-managed groups.   
 
H2b: The groups with a leader will achieve higher joint outcomes than the self-managed 
groups.  
 
Similarly, as the judgement accuracy of the groups with an incentivised member is 
expected to match that of the pro-social groups with a leader, the groups with an 
incentivised member are expected to match the groups with a leader in terms of joint 
outcomes.  
 
H2c: The groups with an incentivised member will not differ from the pro-social groups 
with a leader in terms of joint outcomes. 
  
Method 
Design 
This study has an experimental design, with groups of three participants being 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions; a ‘self-managed’ condition, a ‘leader’ 
condition and an ‘advice’ condition. This study took the form of a field experiment, with 
research taking place in public (leisure) places outside the laboratory. Each group 
performed a face-to-face role-playing negotiation exercise, which has integrative potential. 
The first dependent variable is the judgement accuracy of the group members concerning 
each other’s preferences. In other words, how accurately each group member can judge the 
preferences of the others after negotiating. The second dependent variable is the number of 
points that the group achieved as a whole, also known as the ‘joint outcomes’ of the 
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negotiation. The independent variable is the condition that groups are assigned to. The 
condition with neither a leader nor incentivised member serves as our baseline 
measurement of how well self-managed teams negotiate. By comparing the self-managed 
condition to the ‘leader’ condition we can see if we have managed to replicate the finding 
that self-managed teams do not perform as well as pro-social groups with a leader. The 
condition with an appointed leader also serves as the ‘aspiration point’ for the ‘advice’ 
condition. Comparing these two conditions will reveal whether the advised behaviours can 
increase joint outcomes to match the joint outcomes of a pro-social group with a leader. If 
this is the case, this may indicate that these behaviours are the key to achieving the 
negotiation benefits of formal leadership whilst still retaining group autonomy.  
 
Participants and selection 
For our study we aimed to select participants between 18 and 67 years of age. The 
minimum age was 18 as it was not possible to obtain informed consent from parents 
allowing their children to participate for participants younger than 18. Furthermore, we 
couldn’t be sure that the results of previous studies generalised to children, nor that children 
and adults negotiate in the same way, as previous research has not included this age group. 
The maximum age of 67 was imposed to ensure that everyone was of working age, as it 
wasn’t possible to be sure that the elderly negotiate the same way as other adults do, as 
previous research has not focused on this age group. In total, 201 participants took part in 
67 groups of three. The ages ranged from 17
1
 to 58, (M = 23.43, SD = 6.73, Md = 23), with 
71.6 percent of participants falling between the university ages of 18-24 years old. 
                                                 
1
 Our sample included six participants aged 17 in total. When recruiting participants we aimed to include only 
those participants aged 18 and over, however asking for age among younger groups might have had an undue 
influence on their negotiation behaviour, possibly by making their age more salient. The study did not include 
any activities that required a legal age limit of 18 or anything that may be considered aversive to a minor. 
Consequently, age judgements were done ‘by eye’. Hence, a number of cases are included that did not quite 
meet the requirement of being 18 years old or over.  
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Participants were recruited from public (leisure) places, such as parks and beaches, as well 
as within the private networks of the researchers. As recruitment predominantly took place 
in and around student towns, this may explain the large number of participants around 
student age in our sample. In terms of gender, n = 118 participants were female and n = 83 
participants were male. Groups consisted of 27 all-female groups, 14 all-male groups and 
26 mixed groups. Gender composition had no effect on either of the dependent variables 
and was therefore excluded from further analyses. Existing groups were sought out, so it 
was likely that the participants knew each other, and expected to interact with one another 
beyond the negotiation exercise. As the exercise was translated into Dutch, English and 
German, participants had to be fluent in one of these languages to be able to participate. 
One hundred and seventy six participants were Dutch native speakers, 10 were English-
speaking, three French, two German, two Portuguese and the rest were Maltese, Italian, 
Spanish, Greek, Czech, Turkish, Polish or failed to fill in their native language.  
 
Procedure 
Pre-existing groups of participants were recruited by the experimenters, 
predominantly in parks in and around student towns. Participants were informed that they 
could win five Euros each by taking part in a ‘negotiation game’ for the University of 
Leiden. All participants were given their cover letters and pay-off schedules whilst they 
received a brief explanation of the exercise and how the reward system worked. The 
distribution of the three characters (Alex, Chris and Bo) among the participants was 
random. Similarly the distribution of groups across the three experimental conditions was 
also random. The aim and rules of the game were explained. Participants were informed 
that they could discuss anything, including the points on their pay-off schedules, but that 
they must not show their pay-off schedules to anyone. If they did, the game would be over 
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and they would win nothing. Participants gave informed consent for the anonymous use of 
their data, including voice recordings of each negotiation session. Before starting the 
negotiation each participant filled out a number of questions on their cover letter to check 
whether they had understood the instructions correctly and to indicate their current mood. If 
they answered the pay-off schedule questions incorrectly, indicating that they had not 
(fully) understood the instructions, further explanation was given by the experimenter until 
all participants fully understood how to use the pay-off schedule. Participants were given a 
final opportunity to ask any questions before commencing with the negotiation. Participants 
were given 20 minutes to negotiate with one another, or until an agreement was reached, 
whichever happened soonest. After 20 minutes, participants were notified and they had to 
note down their final agreement (or note down nothing if they had reached an impasse, in 
which case the group earned zero points). Participants then filled in a questionnaire and a 
lottery was performed to see if the group members would receive five Euros each. For an 
explanation of the lottery system please see the section on social motives manipulation 
below. In the ‘advice’ condition, all group members received a small sweet for filling in the 
questionnaire. Those who had won the lottery were then paid five Euros each and asked to 
sign for receipt. Finally, participants were all thanked and debriefed verbally. Those who 
expressed further interest were given a letter with an extensive explanation of the purpose 
of the research.  
 
The task  
The ‘Aloha Beach Club’ task is a negotiation exercise that was developed for a 
previous study by Van Tol and Steinel (2017). It involves a three-party negotiation, 
including three characters with gender-neutral names, Alex, Chris and Bo, who run a 
cocktail bar together. Each character receives their own pay-off schedule, as seen in Table 
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1, indicating preferences and points that can be earned across eight issues that must be 
negotiated.  
Table 1. Pay-off schedules for Alex, Chris and Bo 
Issue  Alex Bo Chris 
Working hours 6h shift 
8h shift 
9h shift 
500 
1000 
0 
500 
1000 
0 
500 
1000 
0 
Days closed Closed on Sunday 
Closed on Monday morning 
Closed on Monday night 
200 
100 
0 
0 
500 
1000 
200 
100 
0 
Vacation days 18 vacation days + 20 days unpaid leave 
22 vacation days + 10 days unpaid leave 
26 vacation days  
200 
100 
0 
200 
100 
0 
0 
500 
1000 
New dishes on the 
menu 
More meat 
More fish 
More vegetarian 
0 
500 
1000 
200 
100 
0 
200 
100 
0 
New cocktail on the 
menu 
Sex on the beach 
Frozen lime margarita 
Strawberry caipirinha  
500 
300 
0 
0 
300 
500 
500 
300 
0 
Hot drinks served From 9:00 to 19:00 
From 9:00 to 21:00 
From 9:00 to 23:00 
500 
300 
0 
500 
300 
0 
0 
300 
500 
Division of tips Divide weekly 
Divide monthly 
Keep own tips 
0 
300 
500 
500 
300 
0 
500 
300 
0 
Cleaning schedule Day shift cleans before shift 
Night shift cleans after shift 
Cleaning is equally divided over shifts 
1000 
0 
100 
0 
100 
1000 
100 
1000 
0 
 
For each issue, there are three possible options to choose from. Each character has 
three high-priority issues (offering a maximum of 1000 points), three moderately important 
issues (maximum 500 points) and two issues that are less important (maximum 200 points). 
One issue is wholly compatible; all three characters get the highest number of points for an 
eight-hour work shift. A further six issues have integrative potential, including tip division, 
on which day the bar is closed, when hot drinks should be served, new cocktails to be 
included on the menu, new dishes for the menu and number of holiday days. On each of 
these issues, two characters are in agreement and the third has an opposite preference. For 
each character, one of these six issues is ‘high-priority’, offering a maximum of 1000 
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points. The final issue is wholly distributive, with each character holding a different, high-
priority preference. Depending on how these eight issues are resolved, each character earns 
a certain number of points for themselves, up to a maximum of 4900 points. Adding up 
these individual scores produces the ‘joint outcomes’ for the group, which can produce a 
maximum of 10100 points. If a compromise were to be made on each of the six integrative 
issues, the joint outcomes would be 8900. Should one player claim the maximum amount 
of value for themselves, they would score 4900 points and the joint outcomes would be 
8400. To support each character’s preference, with preferred solutions being the ones that 
earn the most points, the pay-off schedules also included substantive reasons why each 
solution was preferred, such as “You are planning a long road trip this autumn so you need 
as many total days off as possible. 18 vacation days plus 20 days unpaid leave would be the 
best for you.”  
 
Independent variables 
 Experimental condition. The sample was divided into three conditions: the self-
managed condition, the leader condition and the advice condition. In the self-managed 
condition, participants’ instructions (in the case of Alex) read, “You play Alex, Bo and 
Chris, who work at the Aloha Beach Club…You are Alex.” All participants in the self-
managed condition had equal power. In the self-managed groups and groups with a leader, 
participants filled out cover letters with three questions to check they understood how to 
use their pay-off schedule. They then answered one question concerning who was the most 
powerful in the group, followed by a short questionnaire on their current mood.  
Power was manipulated through varying the instructions on the cover letter that 
participants received. In the groups with a leader, the cover letters indicated to all group 
members who the leader or “boss” was. For instance, they read, “You are Alex. Chris is the 
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boss of the team.” During the explanation of the game, the experimenter pointed out the 
three characters and emphasised who was the boss. Everyone was informed that this person 
had the power to make a binding decision if the group could not agree on an issue. The 
cover letter read, “If you cannot agree on a solution, then Chris, the boss, will decide which 
solution to choose for this problem.” The experimenter further emphasised this when 
explaining the rules of the game. The cover letter for Alex (in the ‘leader’ condition) can be 
found in the appendix for further reference.  
Finally, advice was manipulated by changing the information given on participants’ 
cover letters. Just as in the self-managed conditions, everyone in this condition had equal 
power. In the groups with an incentivised member, this member received confidential 
advice. Their two counterparts filled in cover letters identical to those used in the self-
managed groups and groups with a leader. The participant receiving advice received a 
different cover letter. These participants read an additional excerpt on their cover letter, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1. Cover letter advice excerpt to incentivise participants to provide, seek and listen to information 
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The key goal (reaching a good agreement through understanding what the others 
want) was underlined, written in italics and coloured red to ensure that it would not escape 
notice. Further key words were also written in italics and in bold, such as “most points”, 
“understand each other’s preferences”, “a quiz” and “bonus”. The confidentiality of the 
quiz and the bonus, as well as the specific instructions were also written in bold italics (and 
using bullet points) to ensure that the main points of the message could be remembered 
more easily. The bonus mentioned was a small snack, such as a muesli bar or chocolate. 
The other members of the groups with an incentivised member were not aware of the quiz 
or the bonus, or the fact that one member had received additional advice. Instead of 
answering questions about their mood, those receiving advice answered a multiple-choice 
question to see if they had understood the advice. By including the short mood 
questionnaire for non-advised participants, those receiving advice had enough time to read 
the excerpt and answer the multiple choice question without raising suspicion by taking 
longer to complete their cover letter than their two counterparts.  
 Social motives induction. To ensure that all groups would share a pro-social 
motivation similar to that of self-managed teams, all individual rewards were made 
contingent upon group performance. This was done by means of a performance-dependent 
chance of winning the five Euro prize. Each group was informed that for each 100 points 
that the team earned as a whole, they would earn a winning lottery ticket to be added to a 
bag of non-winning tickets. After the exercise, one participant would draw a ticket from the 
bag. If the ticket was a winning ticket then each group member received five Euros, if it 
was a non-winning ticket then the team won nothing. The bag always contained 101 non-
winning tickets. The maximum number of points the group could earn as a whole was 
10100, which would result in the addition of 101 winning tickets to the lottery bag. This 
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ensured that the chance of winning the prize increased as performance increased but never 
exceeded 50 percent.  
 
Measures 
For our research, we made use of a number of questionnaire items to check the 
success of our various experimental manipulations and to measure our dependent variables.  
 Power manipulation checks. Various manipulation checks were used to determine 
whether the manipulation of power (leader versus no leader) was successful. Firstly, the 
cover letters included a multiple-choice question asking participants to indicate who was 
the most powerful in their group. There were four possible answers: “Alex”, “Bo”, “Chris” 
and “We are all equally powerful.” This revealed whether participants in the groups with a 
leader could correctly identify the boss of the team and whether participants in the self-
managed groups and groups with an incentivised member could correctly identify that they 
were all equally powerful. As a further check of the success of the power manipulation, 
power dispersion perceptions were measured after the negotiation using two items to be 
answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 7 = ‘strongly agree’). All items 
included in the post-negotiation questionnaire were answered on the same 7-point scale, 
unless otherwise indicated. The two power dispersion items were, “One of the players was 
more powerful than the other two” (reverse-scored) and “All three of us were equally 
powerful.” Taken together these two items proved to be reliable scales for Alex, Bo and 
Chris separately (Cronbach’s alpha = .81 for Alex, .81 for Bo and .85 for Chris), so scores 
on these two items were summed together to create power dispersion perception scores for 
Alex, Bo and Chris. As a final check of the power manipulation, all participants answered 
an item concerning the perception of their own power, “I was the most powerful player of 
us three.” 
 22 
 Advice manipulation checks. Various manipulation checks were used to determine 
whether or not the advice manipulation had been successful. Firstly, the cover letters of 
those receiving advice included a multiple-choice question concerning the advice they had 
just received. The question read, “What do you need to do, according to the confidential 
extra information above?” There were four possible answers, “Tell the group what your 
preferences are”, “Ask your group members what they want”, “Listen to what the others 
say, to understand what they want” and, “All of the above.” The correct answer was “All of 
the above.” This question revealed whether participants receiving the advice had read and 
understood the advice given. As a further manipulation check, all participants filled in six 
self-report items on advised behaviours performed during the negotiation. These items 
included, “I made sure that the others wouldn’t know where I could earn most points” 
(reverse-scored), “I asked Bo and Alex2 what they wanted and/or what was important to 
them” and “I found it important to listen to what the others wanted.” Taken together these 
six items proved to be reliable scales for Alex, Bo and Chris separately (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .91 for Alex, .88 for Bo and .85 for Chris), so scores on these six items were summed 
together to create self-report advised behaviours scores for Alex, Bo and Chris. As a final 
manipulation check for the advice, each participant filled out three items concerning their 
counterparts’ performance of advised behaviours during the negotiation. These three items 
included, “Alex accurately and openly talked about his/her preferences”, “Alex listened 
carefully to what the others had to say” and, “Alex tried to understand what was important 
to Bo and me.” As each participant was rated on three items by both of their counterparts, 
this meant that there were six peer-report items of advised behaviours for each character. 
Taken together these six items proved to be highly reliable scales for Alex, Bo and Chris 
                                                 
2
 For each player, the names of the other two players were used in this item and other, 
similar, items. So Alex answered about Bo and Chris, Bo answered about Alex and Chris 
and Chris answered about Alex and Bo. 
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separately (Cronbach’s alpha = .92 for Alex, .91 for Bo and .94 for Chris), so scores on 
these six items were summed together to create peer-report advised behaviour scores for 
Alex, Bo and Chris.  
 Social motives induction check. To check whether all groups were socially 
motivated each participant answered four items concerning own and others’ interests and/or 
points. These items included, “In the negotiation I found it very important to take my own 
interests into account” (reverse-scored), and, “It was crucial for me that the entire group 
collectively get many points.” However, taken together these four items produced highly 
unreliable scales for Alex, Bo and Chris (Cronbach’s alpha = -.39 for Alex, .065 for Bo and 
.14 for Chris). Cronbach’s-alpha-if-item-deleted values also did not give a clear indication 
of items to be removed to improve the scale. Consequently just one item was used, asking 
participants to what extent it had been important to them that the whole group earn many 
points.  
Joint outcomes. To measure joint outcomes, the number of points earned by each 
individual in the group was calculated, providing the individual outcomes of each group 
member. The individual outcomes were summed together to calculate the total number of 
points achieved by the group as a whole, providing the joint outcomes.  
Judgement accuracy. As a measure of how much information was exchanged and 
properly processed during the negotiations, each negotiator answered eight multiple-choice 
questions on the other negotiators’ preferences (the examples given below refer to the 
questions asked to participants in the role of Chris). The questions covered the specific 
content of the preferences e.g. “Which cleaning schedule did Alex prefer?” as well as 
preference alignment between negotiators, e.g. “What were the preferences of the others, 
relative to your own preferences, on the following issues?” with possible answers including 
“Alex agreed with me”, “Bo agreed with me”, “Both agreed with me” and “No one agreed 
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with me”. The final type of question addressed priorities of issues, e.g. “Which issue did Bo 
find most important?” with three different issues given as possible answers. The group’s 
ability to accurately recall the specific preferences and priorities of the group members 
formed an indication of the information exchanged and the resulting judgement accuracy 
achieved. By recoding each of these 24 questions as either ‘correctly answered’ or 
incorrectly answered’, the number of correct answers per group could be calculated. This 
formed the judgement accuracy score for each group.  
Ratings of fellow negotiators. Our peer-report items of advised behaviour were 
embedded among nine items concerning general negotiation behaviours. These items 
included, “He/she decided in which order the problems were discussed”, “He/she decided 
in the team’s best interests” and “He/she fixed on a position and/or refused to make 
concessions.” As our study is not concerned with general negotiation behaviours, these 
items were not included in any further analyses. 
Mood. In order to exactly replicate Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) study, each 
participant filled in a number of 7-point items concerning their current mood before starting 
the negotiation. Those receiving the advice did not receive these questions to fill in. These 
items were also included to give non-advised members something to do while the advised 
members read the advice excerpt. The mood items included “To which extent do you 
feel…excited?”, “…confident?” and “…happy?” As our study is not concerned with the 
effect of mood on negotiation behaviours, these items were not included in any further 
analyses. 
Results 
Power manipulation 
In the groups with a leader, 94.2 percent of participants correctly identified the 
leader, indicating that this manipulation was successful. Furthermore, 89.4 percent of 
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participants in the self-managed groups and groups with an incentivised member correctly 
identified that all participants had equal power. This number may be slightly lower than in 
the groups with a leader as the lack of power is less clearly defined than the explicit 
presence of it.  
To further test the effectiveness of the power manipulation I submitted the power 
dispersion perception scores of Alex, Bo and Chris to a one-way MANOVA, with 
experimental condition as the independent variable. This revealed no main effect of 
condition using Pillai’s trace, V = .181, F(6, 126) = 2.10, p = .058, although it did approach 
significance. This manipulation was an exact replication of the power manipulation used in 
Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) study, where it was found to be successful, further lending 
support to the effectiveness of this manipulation. However, in line with the marginally 
significant result in this study, Hiltermann (2016), who used the same power manipulation 
in cooperatively and individualistically motivated groups, found that the effects of the 
power manipulation were somewhat attenuated in the cooperative groups compared to the 
individualistically motivated groups. This could be due to the fact that power (abuse) is 
expected to play a less salient role in teams that are motivated to work together.  
As a final check of the power manipulation, I assessed how powerful each 
participant reported feeling after the negotiation, using only those participants in the groups 
with a leader. I submitted self-report power scores for Alex, Bo and Chris to a one-way 
(Leader: Alex vs. Bo vs. Chris) MANOVA. Using Pillai’s trace, no significant effect of 
who was the leader on one’s own power perceptions was found, V =  0.499, F(6, 38) = 
2.105, p = .075, although this result did approach significance. However, the means did 
follow the expected patterns, as can be seen in Figure 2. When Alex, Bo and Chris were the 
leader they reported feeling more powerful than when they weren’t the leader, but not 
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significantly so. Furthermore, for Alex, Chris and Bo, the character in the leader position 
reported feeling more powerful than the other two roles, but not significantly so. 
 
Figure 2. Bar graph of mean power perception per role and per leader 
 It is possible that our individual leader groups, consisting of a group of Alex 
characters as the leader, a group of Bo characters and a group of Chris characters, were not 
large enough to have sufficient power to detect an effect. Indeed, there were just seven 
groups in which Alex was the leader, seven groups where Bo was the leader and nine 
groups where Chris was the leader. Additionally, the assumption of homogeneity of 
covariance matrices was not met for the MANOVA, however the largest standard deviation 
was in the largest group (the ‘Chris as leader’ group), rendering the test too conservative. 
Given that the test result approached significance, p = .075, it is possible that this non-
significant result is a consequence of an overly conservative MANOVA. 
 
 
 
 27 
Advice manipulation 
Of those receiving advice, 91.7 percent correctly identified the advice they’d been 
given prior to negotiating. This indicates that the advice manipulation was successful. As a 
further check of the advice manipulation, self-report advised behaviour scores for Alex, Bo 
and Chris were entered into a one-way (Advice: Alex vs. Bo vs. Chris) MANOVA, using 
only those participants in the groups with an incentivised member. Using Pillai’s trace a 
non-significant result was found, V = 0.17, F(6, 40) = 0.62, p = .711, indicating that 
receiving advice had no significant effect on self-report of performing advised behaviours 
during the negotiation. This would suggest that our advice manipulation was unsuccessful. 
Another possibility is that self-serving biases came into play when participants filled out 
the post-negotiation questionnaires, resulting in high scores for all participants, regardless 
of whether or not they received advice. Indeed, considering the mean self-report of advised 
behaviours for Alex (M = 31.15, SD = 10.07), Bo (M = 30.73, SD = 9.64) and Chris (M = 
30.67, SD = 9.17) across all conditions we see that the means lie above the average score of 
24, which we would expect to see if participants had filled in the middle score of 4 on all 
six items of this scale. A one-sample t-test confirmed that characters playing Alex across all 
conditions rated themselves significantly above the mid-point of the scale for advised 
behaviours, t = 5.81, p < .001. The same was true for characters playing Bo across all 
conditions, t = 5.71, p < .001 and for characters playing Chris, t = 5.95, p < .001. It appears 
that all participants feel they score above the midpoint of the scale when it comes to being 
open, accurate, asking questions, listening closely and trying to understand what their 
counterparts want. As a final check of our advice manipulation a one-way (Advice: Alex 
vs. Bo vs. Chris vs. None) MANOVA was performed, with Alex, Bo and Chris’ peer-report 
advised behaviours as the dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, a non-significant result 
was found, V = 0.10, F(6, 40) = .35, p = .908, indicating that receiving advice did not have 
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a significant effect on peer-reports of performing advised behaviours during the 
negotiation. It seems that advised people, if they did indeed perform the advised behaviours 
at all, did not do so to the extent that their peers could notice it. Although retrospective 
reports are subject to error, these findings suggest that our advice manipulation was not 
very effective at affecting participants’ behaviour during the negotiation. Although the 
advice was well understood, as evidenced by the high accuracy in identifying the advice 
given prior to negotiating, it failed to effect a change in participants’ behaviour.   
 
Social motives induction 
On average, participants across all conditions scored above the scale mid-point of 4 
when indicating the importance of earning points as a group (M = 5.63, SD = 1.86). This 
shows that our social motives induction was successful in motivating participants to 
maximise group outcomes. Considered separately, groups in each condition scored highly 
on pro-social motivation (Mequal = 5.67, SD = 2.00; Madvice = 5.69, SD = 1.88; Mleader = 5.54, 
SD = 1.81), indicating that this induction was well understood in each of our three 
conditions.  
 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis one. Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c predicted that the groups with a leader 
or an incentivised member would both outperform the self-managed groups in terms of 
judgement accuracy, and that there would be no significant difference in judgement 
accuracy between the groups with a leader and the groups with an incentivised member. To 
test these hypotheses, a one-way ANOVA was performed with experimental condition as 
the independent variable and the total number of correct answers per group on the 
judgement accuracy questionnaire as the dependent variable. The results showed no 
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significant main effect of condition, F(2, 64) = 1.175, p = .315, ω = 0.01 (Mself-managed = 
13.60, SD = 5.28, Madvice = 14.83, SD = 3.73, Mleader = 15.70, SD = 4.46), indicating that 
there was no significant difference between our conditions in terms of judgement accuracy. 
This means that hypotheses 1a, and 1b are unsupported. Hypothesis 1c, predicting that 
there would be no different between the groups with a leader and the groups with an 
incentivised member in terms of judgement accuracy, was supported by the data. 
 Hypothesis two. Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c predicted that the groups with a leader 
and groups with an incentivised member would both outperform the self-managed groups 
in terms of joint outcomes and that there would be no significant difference in joint 
outcomes between the groups with a leader and the groups with an incentivised member. 
To test these hypotheses, a one-way ANOVA was performed with experimental condition 
as the independent variable and joint outcomes as the dependent variable. The results 
showed that there was no significant main effect of condition, F(2, 64) = 0.50, p = .611, ω 
= -0.15, meaning that Hypotheses 2a and 2b are unsupported by the data. Hypothesis 2c, 
predicting that there would be no difference between the groups with a leader and the 
groups with an incentivised member in terms of joint outcomes, was supported. However, 
based on these results one must conclude that receiving advice and appointing an official 
leader both have no impact on judgement accuracy or joint outcomes.  
Additional analyses. In light of the unexpected results for judgement accuracy and 
joint outcomes, I performed some additional analyses in an attempt to discover why 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b were not supported. Whilst performing the experiment, it was 
noticeable that a large number of groups discussed the points printed on their pay-off 
schedules. Groups that discovered that they could talk about the points and simply calculate 
which solution would earn the most points for the team rarely engaged in thorough 
discussion of the preferences, opting to simply do the maths instead. This may have created 
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a ‘ceiling effect’ in terms of joint outcomes. Indeed, 32 of the 67 groups achieved the 
maximum score of 10100 points for the group. These maximum scores were also 
approximately equally divided across the conditions, with 10 groups in the ‘self-managed’ 
condition achieving the maximum score, 13 groups in the ‘advice’ condition and nine 
groups in the ‘leader’ condition. This suggests that the condition a group was in had little to 
no influence on whether or not a group (talked about points and) achieved the maximum 
score. Therefore, it is worth trying to discover whether talking about points may have 
affected our data in unexpected ways. Groups that discussed points were generally very 
quick to complete the negotiation exercise, as they did not engage in thorough discussion. 
Therefore, we can use the time taken to negotiate as an indication of whether groups talked 
about points or not. To gauge the effect of talking about points on joint outcomes, a 
correlation was calculated between negotiation time and joint outcomes. This correlation 
was significant, r = -.45, p < .001, indicating that the shorter the time taken to negotiate, the 
higher the number of points earned by the group. This supports the idea that discussing 
points was highly influential on joint outcomes, and that groups who discussed points were 
more likely to earn high scores. This effect is well demonstrated in Figure 2, showing joint 
outcomes plotted against time taken to negotiate. Groups taking between three to six 
minutes uniformly achieved the maximum score and indeed such a brief negotiation time 
would have been impossible to achieve if groups had engaged in substantive discussion as 
opposed to calculating the best solutions based on points.  
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of joint outcomes against time taken to negotiate 
To further investigate the effects of discussing points, I considered the effect of 
discussing points on groups’ judgement accuracy. By neglecting to engage in thorough 
discussion, judgement accuracy was likely reduced, as it is difficult to remember 
preferences that haven’t been discussed thoroughly. Consequently one would expect there 
to be a significantly positive correlation between time taken to negotiate (again, as an 
indication of whether groups talked about points) and groups’ judgement accuracy scores. 
This is indeed what was found, r = .25, p = .043. The shorter the time taken to negotiate, 
the lower judgement accuracy was. This suggests that top performers, who tended to take 
less time to negotiate, may have more frequently been talking about points, failing to 
engage in substantive discussion and thereby reducing their judgement accuracy. This may 
explain why condition did not have a main effect on judgement accuracy scores, as the 
effect of the condition was no longer relevant as soon as a group figured out that they could 
discuss points instead of interests. If discussion of points led to both a drop in judgement 
accuracy and a rise in joint outcomes, one might expect a negative correlation between 
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judgement accuracy and joint outcomes. However, it was still possible to obtain high joint 
outcomes through substantive discussion, which would likely have also raised judgement 
accuracy, in turn predicting a positive correlation between joint outcomes and judgement 
accuracy. This may explain why there was no significant correlation between judgement 
accuracy and joint outcomes, r = .07, p = .557. High judgement accuracy, though possibly 
beneficial to earning points, was not necessary as soon as points were discussed during the 
negotiation.  
 
Discussion 
Can self-managed teams effectively manage their negotiations? Do they have a 
disadvantage when compared to teams with a formal leader? Does incentivising 
information facilitation behaviour effectively replicate the previously found positive effects 
of having a formal leader within self-managed teams? These are the questions that this 
study investigated and aimed to answer. This was attempted by partially replicating and 
extending the research design of Van Tol and Steinel (2017), who found that power 
asymmetry amplified the positive effects of pro-social motivation, such that pro-socially 
motivated teams with a leader outperformed pro-socially motivated teams with equal 
power.  In this study, which used the same research paradigm, this finding was not 
replicated. Instead, it was found that having a leader or being incentivised to facilitate 
information exchange did not affect the outcomes of the negotiation relative to not having a 
leader or not being thus incentivised. Furthermore, it was found that having a leader or 
being incentivised to facilitate information exchange did not influence judgement accuracy. 
There are a number of reasons why these contradictory results may have been found using 
the same paradigm.  
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Benefits of leadership 
The logical starting point for discussion is the inability to replicate Van Tol and 
Steinel’s (2017) finding that leaders help pro-social teams to out-perform leaderless teams 
in negotiations, as this finding was a prerequisite to finding that said leader-related benefits 
can be induced in self-managed teams. As already discussed in the results section, it is 
possible that allowing groups to discuss points may have influenced judgement accuracy 
and negotiation outcomes in unanticipated ways. Although Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) 
study included the option to talk about points as well, there may be one crucial difference 
that caused discussion of points to have a greater impact in this study. Whereas Van Tol 
and Steinel’s sample were largely recruited at the beach, the current sample was largely 
recruited from parks in and around university towns. Whereas the beach is (also) largely 
populated by tourists in the summer, city parks tend to be populated by the city’s 
inhabitants. Indeed, the current sample contained a large number of participants of student 
age, possibly making the sample demographically different to the one recruited at the beach 
in terms of education level. As students are used to analytical thinking challenges, it is 
possible that they were more likely to discover how the point system worked and 
consequently to score very highly with minimal influence from group leaders. Indeed, an 
appointed leader is not required to structure or lead a negotiation that does not really 
resemble a full negotiation but, instead, resembles a relatively simple maths problem. The 
larger number of students in the current sample may therefore have made the influence of 
leaders relatively redundant compared to the leaders’ influence in Van Tol and Steinel’s 
(2017) study. This would certainly explain the ‘ceiling’ effect that was discovered in the 
data, showing that almost half the groups achieved the maximum score, and that the faster 
groups negotiated the higher their scores were. So it seems that this study may have failed 
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to replicate Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) findings due to the relative lack of influence that 
leaders could exert, due to more groups discussing points in the current sample.  
Another option is of course that Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) findings were a one-
off finding, and that leaders of pro-social groups do not in fact help their teams to negotiate 
more effectively. However, Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee (2003) also found that leaders 
are more likely to take action and that, should taking action be a pro-social thing to do, they 
act in the team’s best interests and improve the team’s outcomes. Furthermore, Van 
Knippenberg et al. (2001) found that pro-socially motivated leaders did indeed use their 
power in the best interests of the group, thus improving group outcomes. Thus, given the 
support for Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) findings in the literature, it seems unlikely that 
these were a one-off occurrence.  
 
Judgement accuracy 
Given that the data did not show any benefits of having a leader, it seems logical 
that the proposed mechanism through which leaders were expected to enact benefits was 
also not supported by the data. It was expected that leaders and incentivised members 
would facilitate information exchange, resulting in a more thorough discussion of interests, 
and thus raising the judgement accuracy of these two groups over the self-managed groups. 
However, all groups scored equally on judgement accuracy, indicating that leaders and 
incentivised members failed to raise the judgement accuracy of their groups over that of the 
self-managed groups. This could be due to a number of reasons: leaders and incentivised 
members may not have engaged in information facilitation, self-managed groups may have 
engaged in equally high levels of information exchange, or information facilitation and 
exchange may not have resulted in higher judgement accuracy. In this latter scenario, this 
would suggest that (some) groups thoroughly discussed interests but all failed to remember 
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them when filling out the judgement accuracy questionnaire. However, having participants 
negotiate and subsequently fill out a questionnaire on their counterparts’ preferences is a 
widely-used paradigm that has frequently produced differences in judgement accuracy 
between different conditions (For example, Steinel, Abele & De Dreu, 2007 Thompson, 
1990; Thompson, 1991), suggesting that participants are perfectly capable of remembering 
the negotiation preferences of their counterparts.  
 Possibly, the fact that this sample contained many student-age participants meant 
that all groups were more likely to engage in thorough discussion, regardless of the 
condition the group was in. However, if this were the case, we would expect this increase to 
be equal across all conditions, thus we might still expect there to be an additional effect of 
receiving advice or having a group leader, which was not the case. This would not be the 
expected outcome if self-managed groups were already achieving the maximum judgement 
accuracy, however the judgement accuracy scores indicated an accuracy of barely over 50 
percent, indicating that there was still room for leaders and incentivised members to further 
increase judgement accuracy scores. Thus it seems unlikely that the three conditions did not 
differ on judgement accuracy scores due to some ‘ceiling effect’ of including many 
(analytically-minded) students in the sample. It seems most likely, therefore, that the 
groups with a leader or an incentivised member failed to induce the expected increase in 
information exchange and the resulting judgement accuracy. As mentioned before, the 
discussion of points may have made the leaders and incentivised members redundant, 
achieving maximum scores without having to engage in thorough discussion. A further two 
reasons why the leader and advice groups failed to raise judgement accuracy are also worth 
exploring:  the failure of the advice manipulation and the generalisability of the research 
findings on which the assumptions about leadership behaviours were based.  
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Failure of the advice manipulation. The advice manipulation aimed to ensure that 
incentivised members would openly provide accurate information about preferences, ask 
about others’ preferences and listen closely to their counterparts’ preferences. However no 
differences were found in self-report or peer-report of these behaviours between any of the 
conditions. Without engaging in the advised behaviours, it is likely that groups with 
incentivised members did not engage in more thorough discussion than self-managed 
groups, thus explaining why they did not out-perform self-managed groups in terms of 
judgement accuracy.  
The unsuccessfulness of the manipulation may be due to a number of reasons. 
Firstly, some participants indicated after the negotiation that they had not read the advice 
properly, despite filling in the manipulation check correctly before negotiating. Without 
having read the advice, one would indeed not expect an increase in the advised behaviours. 
Secondly, some participants indicated that they had read and understood the advice, but that 
they had forgotten to implement it during the negotiation. Possibly the novelty and 
complexity of the negotiation situation meant that remembering all the rules and goals of 
the game made it too difficult to remember the advice they had been given, resulting in 
many participants correctly identifying the advice but generally failing to implement it, as 
can be seen in the data. The method for the advice manipulation was based on a study by 
Thompson (1991), in which negotiators in a two-party negotiation were similarly instructed 
to provide and seek information. In Thompson’s (1991) study, advised negotiators did 
indeed engage in higher levels of information provision and seeking, resulting in higher 
joint outcomes. However, it could be that the effectiveness of giving advice is attenuated by 
the addition of more parties to the negotiation. Whereas Thompson (1991) conducting his 
study on two-party negotiations, the current negotiations took place between three people, 
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thus increasing the social and procedural complexity and possibly making it harder to 
remember to implement advice. Furthermore, as a contradiction to Thompson’s (1991) 
findings, Steinel et al. (2007) found that offering advice alone was not sufficient to increase 
the integrativeness of two-person negotiations. Only by allowing negotiators to complete a 
round of negotiation first, and then offering them advice on integrative negotiation did 
negotiators actually manage to implement the advice in a second round of negotiations. 
This resulted in less contentious behaviour, more problem solving and higher joint 
outcomes. So it seems that advice alone may not be enough to ensure that negotiators 
implement it. They must be allowed a combination of experience in negotiation and 
subsequent advice to enable negotiators to use the advice to increase the integrativeness of 
their agreements. Again, this would explain why groups with an incentivised member did 
not show increased information exchange facilitation and, consequently, did not show 
increased judgement accuracy.  
Finally, besides the complexity of the situation making it difficult to remember and 
implement advice, group norms may have been too strong to overcome with some well-
intentioned advice. If the advised players wished to promote a thorough discussion but their 
two counterparts did not, then the prevailing group norm of making quick decisions may 
have prevented the information facilitation from being implemented. Group norms have 
indeed been shown to influence individual’s behaviour (Smith & Louis, 2008; Smith & 
Terry, 2003). For instance, Terry, Hogg and McKimmie (2000) found that participants that 
were placed in a group that did not share their attitude, thus making the group norm 
opposed to their individual norm, were more likely to behave in attitude-inconsistent ways, 
adapting their behaviour to match the prevailing group norm. Particularly because the 
advised players were the only ones aware of the advice and the additional bonus that could 
be earned through accurate answering of the post-negotiation questionnaire, it may have 
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been too easy for advised players to forget the advice and/or hesitate to implement it when 
faced with the norms of the group. Taken together, there are numerous possible causes for 
the unsuccessfulness of the advice manipulation. Without implementation of the advice, 
information exchange was not facilitated in the advice condition and the expected resulting 
increase in judgement accuracy was not found. This explains why the groups with an 
incentivised member did not out-perform self-managed groups in terms of judgement 
accuracy, but what about groups with a leader? To explain their lack of judgement 
accuracy, we must turn to the second reason mentioned before: the generalisability of the 
research findings on which the assumptions about leadership behaviours were based.  
Assumptions about leadership behaviours. Based on the literature, the power 
holders would have been expected to naturally engage in more information provision and 
seeking, as well as paying close attention to what their counterparts said. However, official 
group leaders did not show increased self-report or peer-report of the expected leadership 
behaviours (which are identical to the advised behaviours). It seems that being identified as 
the leader may not be sufficient to make someone act like a leader. Considering the 
literature upon which the assumptions were based, there are some key differences and 
boundary conditions that were not taken into account.  
First of all, leaders were expected to more openly share their preferences based on 
two studies by Anderson and Berdahl (2002) and Anderson and Galinsky (2006). In the 
first study, power holders had complete power to make unilateral decisions within a dyad, 
ostensibly based on legitimate reasons, such as previous experience with leadership. The 
dyad members did not know each other prior to taking part. Power holders did not discuss 
their decision with their counterpart and also knew they would not have to see their 
counterpart after having made the decision. In the current study power holders did know 
their counterparts, and knew they would be interacting again in the future. Possibly this 
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knowledge meant that power holders were reluctant to use their power, for fear of negative 
consequences for their relationship with their counterparts, extending beyond the 
experimental situation. For instance, leaders may have been reluctant to use their decision-
making powers for fear of upsetting their friends and being held accountable after the 
experiment. Social consequences have indeed been shown to influence the use of power, 
more specifically punishment power. Molenmaker, De Kwaadsteniet and Van Dijk (2016) 
studied individuals’ willingness to punish others for not cooperating in a social dilemma 
game. They found that individuals were less likely to punish defectors if they thought they 
were making the punishment decision by themselves, than when they thought they were 
making the decision as part of a group. This effect was mediated by the increased 
responsibility participants felt if they alone were responsible for deciding whether or not to 
use their punishment power. Informing participants that they would be held accountable for 
the punishment decisions they made further increased this sense of responsibility.  
Furthermore, whereas the power-holders in Anderson and Berdahl’s (2002) study 
believed they held power based on legitimate reasons, the leaders in the current study knew 
they had been randomly selected. A study by Van Knippenberg et al. (2001) found that 
power holders who were told that they were more competent than their counterparts were 
more likely to use their power than those who thought they were less competent. In this 
case, competence may have provided legitimate grounds for ‘justifying’ their power and the 
use thereof, something that the power holders in the current study did not have. 
Consequently, leaders may not have felt like they could truly use their power, resulting in 
lower self-reports and peer-reports of power. Taken together, fear of negative social 
consequences and knowledge that power was randomly assigned may have prevented the 
leaders in the current study from using their power and feeling like true power-holders.  
Without feeling like a leader, it is possible that the power holders also did not act like 
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leaders, meaning that they were no more likely to openly reveal their preferences than non-
leaders.  
The second study that found that leaders more openly reveal information defined 
power as having a strong BATNA (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). In the current study, 
without such a BATNA, and without feeling as though they could use their decision-
making power (without negative social consequences), it may be that the leaders felt just as 
vulnerable as their non-leader counterparts, again explaining why power holders were not 
found to more openly reveal their preferences.  
The second expected power effect was greater information seeking, based on two 
studies by Handgraaf et al. (2008) and Van Dijk and Vermunt (2000). These studies found 
that absolute power holders are more empathetic towards their counterparts, taking their 
interests into account to a greater extent. This greater concern for others was shown to be a 
result of a greater sense of social responsibility that comes with having absolute power. In 
both studies, however, power holders remained anonymous and did not have to face their 
‘subordinates’. Power holders were also required to make a unilateral decision, rather than 
simply being given this option. If the leaders in the current study did not (intend to) use 
their powers, they may not have felt as responsible for their actions, thus reducing their 
empathy and their tendency to discover their counterparts’ interests to that of non-leaders.  
Finally, we expected power holders to listen more closely to their counterparts’ 
wishes and desires, based on a study by Blader and Chen (2012). Again, this study used 
dyads as opposed to groups, and participants did not know one another well. Power holders 
were simply informed that they had a more powerful role than their counterpart, but were 
given no decision-making power. This difference in power base and number of negotiating 
parties may have created differences in terms of the power effects we could have expected 
to see in the current study. Taken together, there are numerous reasons why we may not 
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have seen the expected leadership behaviours and the expected consequences thereof. 
Leaders that do not truly feel like leaders are unlikely to behave as leaders are expected to 
behave. This lack of leadership behaviour means that information was not facilitated as 
expected, thus not causing the expected increase in judgement accuracy. 
 
Joint outcomes 
Greater judgement accuracy in the groups with a leader and groups with an 
incentivised member was expected to allow these groups to out-perform self-managed 
groups in terms of joint outcomes. Given that the expected increase in judgement accuracy 
for groups with a leader or an incentivised member was not found, it is unsurprising that the 
resulting increase in joint outcomes was also not evidenced in the data. Consequently, all 
groups scored equally, either through discussion of points and/or because the expected 
leadership and advised behaviours were not successfully induced in our groups with a 
leader or an incentivised member.  
 
Implications 
So what do these results mean for self-managing teams and for the negotiation 
field? If the finding that leaders of pro-social groups increase negotiation outcomes over 
those of self-managed groups is indeed a one-off that cannot be replicated then this bodes 
well for self-managed teams. This would mean that they do not suffer any disadvantages of 
not having a formal leader where negotiation is concerned. Consequently, it would not be 
necessary for self-managed teams to attempt to compensate for the absence of formal 
leadership to avoid any negotiation or decision-making disadvantages relative to 
traditionally led teams. However, if the positive effect of leadership is real, but 
undetectable in the data due to the influence of discussing points, then this may mean that 
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points could be the key to compensating for the absence of formal leadership in self-
managed teams. Indeed, if discussing points is what allowed all conditions to perform 
equally well in this study then this may be an area worth investigating. Future research 
should look into the effect of individual members assigning points to a number of issues as 
a reflection of the importance of those issues to the self. This may help members of teams, 
and self-managed teams in particular, to structure negotiations and discover opportunities 
for logrolling, as quantifying priorities may help to simplify the negotiation situation. 
However, as we have seen, judgement accuracy may suffer as a result of this. If discussion 
of points increased joint outcomes but decreased judgement accuracy then it would be 
important to gauge the value of knowing exactly who wanted what in a negotiation beyond 
helping teams to increase their joint outcomes. It is possible, for instance, that high 
judgement accuracy wouldn’t be needed to achieve high joint outcomes in a single 
negotiation, but that remembering who wanted what, and consequently remembering who 
didn’t get what they wanted, may be valuable in future negotiations. For example, if one 
team member sacrificed a lot of their own interests in the interest of the team in a previous 
negotiation, it may be prudent to favour that person’s interests in a subsequent negotiation, 
to avoid disadvantaging individual team members. In this way, logrolling could occur not 
only within a single negotiation but also across negotiations and across time, as teams 
repeatedly come together to interact and make decisions. Future research should look into 
the value of judgement accuracy beyond increasing joint outcomes within a single 
negotiation.  
Although our study did not manage to replicate Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) 
findings, it did partially replicate Steinel et al.’s (2007) findings that simply offering advice 
before a negotiation is not enough to ensure that the advice will be implemented. Future 
research should use a different method for giving advice, possibly following Steinel et al.’s 
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(2007) method of allowing a team to experience negotiating first, then offering advice, and 
then allowing them to negotiate once more. Another option might be to make the advice 
given known to everyone, as opposed to giving advice to just one person in the team. 
Advised players may have struggled to impose a new group norm by themselves, especially 
amidst the social and procedural complexity of a three-person negotiation. Future research 
should make the advice known to everyone, or else use a manipulation that legitimises the 
changing of group norms, such as appointing someone publicly as ‘devil’s advocate’. 
Finally, the failure of the current study in replicating Thompson’s (1991) successful advice 
manipulation might have been due to the increased complexity of three-person negotiations 
relative to dyadic negotiation. This further highlights the need for greater focus on group 
negotiation in the scientific literature. 
Furthermore, our study highlights the importance of social context in how power is 
perceived and used. The literature upon which the advice was based, and which led to the 
expectation that leaders would to provide more information, seek more information and 
listen more closely, used power holders that did not know their subordinates and would not 
face any social consequences of power use. As mentioned previously, leaders in the current 
study may have feared being held accountable for their power use after the negotiation had 
concluded, thus making them less willing to make use of their power. Future research 
should take this into account when aiming to model an accurate work team situation. Power 
holders within work teams, who do know their subordinates and will have to work with 
them in future, may behave differently than one might expect based on literature that allows 
or demands anonymous power use.  
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Limitations and future research 
As is the case for all research, this study contained a number of limitations and 
elements that might be improved upon. Firstly, the sample size was relatively small, 
possibly reducing the statistical power of the analyses. Although reduced power lends extra 
credibility to any significant results that are found, it may mask small to medium effects 
that cannot be detected. Future research should include larger samples.  
Secondly, there were some issues with the manipulations of advice. The advice 
seems to have been well understood but not correctly implemented in many cases. The 
potential reasons for this and suggestions for solutions have been discussed in the previous 
section. The suggested solutions include allowing groups to negotiate first before giving 
them advice, and then asking them to negotiate once more. Another solution might be to 
make the advice public, or to publicly appoint a devil’s advocate to justify the changing of 
prevailing group norms and aid the group in remembering to implement the advice. 
Furthermore, the advice was based on previous negotiation literature, however this 
literature focused on dyadic negotiation. Due to the relative simplicity of dyadic negotiation 
relative to group negotiation, the effects of offering advice may be different depending on 
the number of parties negotiating. The same holds true for the effect of power. Future 
research should focus more on group negotiation, as the increased complexity of these 
negotiations may make much of the current (dyadic) negotiation literature inapplicable.  
The manipulation checks for advice and power were measured using retrospective 
self-report methods. This potentially introduces memory and self-serving biases, which 
might have resulted in inaccurate reports of negotiation behaviours, particularly self-
serving self-reports of the advised behaviours. Future research should use methods of 
measuring behaviour that are less sensitive to bias, such as recording and coding 
behaviours so that one does not have to rely on self-report.   
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Besides potential issues with the manipulation checks, the power manipulation, as 
discussed previously, may have failed due to the lack of justification for power being 
assigned to a particular group member, as well as fear of social consequences of using 
power. Future studies involving power should take this into account when designing their 
manipulations. Power should be manipulated in such a way that it accurately reflects the 
power situation that the study is trying to model. Furthermore, the current study used 
participants from the general population in a non-work setting. Although this allowed us to 
more accurately replicate Van Tol and Steinel’s (2017) study, this may have reduced the 
generalisability of our findings to self-managed teams and traditionally led work teams. To 
further investigate how self-managed teams negotiate, it is vital that studies are carried out 
in existing work teams. This kind of naturalistic study would accurately capture real-world 
power structures and dynamics as well as producing more generalisable results. Studies on 
decision making within existing self-managed teams have already noted their unique 
vulnerability to ‘groupthink’ (Manz & Sims, 1982; Moorhead et al., 1998), however it 
would be interesting to expand this research to a more general evaluation of how self-
managed teams negotiate and their particular strengths and weaknesses therein.  
Finally, our study aimed to partially replicate that of Van Tol and Steinel (2017). 
Consequently, allowing groups to talk about points, just as they had done, allowed us to 
accurately replicate their study. However, as discussed, talking about points during the 
negotiation may have been a key factor in not being able to replicate their findings, despite 
exactly replicating their method. Future research should test a similar paradigm but without 
the possibility of discussing points. Using the Aloha Beach Club task, discussion of points 
is almost necessary, as the differences between the number of points earned for different 
solutions were sometimes very subtle. For instance, it would have been very difficult for 
Alex to indicate the difference in preference between closing the bar on Monday morning 
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and closing the bar on Sunday night when the difference in points is just 100, on a scale 
from 0 to 1000. Although it is still possible to give some indication of preference, these 
subtleties would have made it almost impossible to earn the maximum number of points 
without discussing the points on the pay-off schedule. Therefore, future research using this 
paradigm, but not allowing the possibility to discuss points, should adapt the pay-off 
schedule so that discussion of points is no longer required to perform very well.  
 
Conclusion 
All in all, this study did not succeed in replicating the finding that pro-social groups 
negotiate better with a leader than without. This might mean that self-managed teams are 
not at a negotiation disadvantage, or it may mean that using points to simplify negotiations 
may help self-managed teams to perform equally well as a pro-social team with a leader. 
The manipulations of advice and power met with some methodological difficulties, 
concerning sample size, self-serving biases, discussion of points and the increased 
complexity of multi-party negotiation relative to dyadic negotiation. Future research should 
take these difficulties, particularly those pertaining to the complexity of multi-party 
negotiations, into account. This study highlights the need for further research into the effect 
of pro-social leadership on group negotiations and group negotiations in general, as well as 
introducing the interesting new idea of using a point system to simplify group negotiations.  
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Appendix 
  
Aloha Beach Club Group number:  
Version:   20170626AA/1 
 
THE GAME  
Practice your negotiation skills! This game is about negotiating and deal-making. You play 
Alex, Bo and Chris, who work at the Aloha Beach Club. This small and successful bar on 
the beach is very busy in summer, thanks to the good food and delicious cocktails.  
You are Alex. You are the boss of the team. 
In order to keep things going smoothly, there is a work meeting. You meet and discuss 
eight problems. There are three possible solutions for each problem. For each problem, you 
have a preference for one of the solutions. With each solution, you can earn a number of 
points.      (Take a look at the blue sheet of paper.) 
OBJECT OF THE GAME  
The object of the game is to reach an agreement on which solution to choose for each 
problem. Try to agree on the solution for each of the eight problems.  
Reaching an agreement. Reaching an agreement means selecting one solution, which 
then applies to everyone. When you agree on the solution selected for a particular problem, 
then everyone marks this solution on their blue sheets.  
Points. Your goal is to earn as many points as possible for the entire team. The greater 
your collective total points, the better your team's chances to win prizes! How do you earn 
points?  By negotiating with your colleagues! Please note: If you do not settle for a solution 
for all of the eight problems, then you earn 0 points and the game is over.  
The boss. If you cannot agree on a solution for a problem, then you, the boss, have to 
decide which solution to choose for this problem.  
 
Important note: You are allowed to talk about everything, but you may NOT show the 
blue sheet to anyone! If you do so, the game is over and you will not win a prize.  
 
Please answer the questions on the reverse side to make sure that all instructions were 
clear. 
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To make sure that all the instructions were clear, please answer the questions below. 
1.  How many points do you earn on the issue "work shift" if you agree on a 6h shift? 
(Mark the correct answer.) 
□ 0 points 
□ 2 points 
□ 10 points 
 
2.  Which solution do you prefer for the problem “Cleaning schedule”? 
(In other words, for which solutions would you earn most points?) 
□ Day shift cleans before shift 
□ Night shift cleans after shift 
□ Cleaning is divided equally over shifts 
 
3. For which of the two problems "Cleaning schedule" and "Division of tips" is it  
more important to find the best possible solution for you? 
(In other words, on which of these two problems can you earn more points?) 
□ Cleaning schedule 
□ Division of tips 
□ Both are equally important to me 
 
4. Who is most powerful in your team? 
□ Alex 
□ Bo 
□ Chris 
□ We are all equally powerful 
 
5. The next questions are about how you feel at this moment. (Mark the number.) 
To which extent do you feel...        not at all                                 very much 
…excited? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…stressed? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…relaxed? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…happy? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…angry? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…confident? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…sad? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…cheerful? 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…insecure?  1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
…tense?   1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
You will get a signal to start. You will have 20 minutes time. Good Luck! 
